Most of the known ecient algorithms designed to compute the nucleolus for special classes of balanced games are based on two facts: (i) in any balanced game, the coalitions which actually determine the nucleolus are essential; and (ii) all essential coalitions in any of the games in the class belong to a prespecied collection of size polynomial in the number of players.
Introduction
The nucleolus is a well-established solution concept for transferable utility cooperative games. It seemingly depends on all coalitional values, but a closer look reveals the inherent high redundancy. Indeed, as Brune (1983) , and more recently Reijnierse and Potters (1998) have proved: in any n-player game there are at most 2n − 2 coalitions which actually determine the nucleolus. Unfortunately, the identication of these coalitions is no less laborious as computing the nucleolus itself. On the other hand, if special properties of the game allow us to specify a priori a collection of polynomial size that contains all nucleolusdening coalitions, then (and only then) we can compute the nucleolus in time polynomial in the number of players.
Many classes of games for which ecient nucleolus algorithms are available have the following properties:
• there is a collection of polynomial size which contains all essential coalitions in any of the games in that class, and • the core is nonempty in any of the games in the class. The key to the eciency of these algorithms is the useful result of Huberman (1980) : in balanced games all nucleolus-dening coalitions are essential.
We identify a subclass of essential coalitions, called strongly essential coalitions, with an increased simplication potential. We show that in any game, the collection of strongly essential coalitions contains all the coalitions which actually determine the core, and in case the core is nonempty, the nucleolus. Using the terminology of Granot et al. (1998) : in balanced games the collection of strongly essential coalitions is a characterization set for the nucleolus. Compared to the concept of essentiality, the added value in strong essentiality is that coalitions must prove to be non-redundant even against families of non-disjoint coalitions. Bondareva and Driessen (1994) used this idea to determine exact bounds for individual payos in the core.
The reduction potential of using strong essentiality in the computation of the nucleolus can be well illustrated by the class of cyclic permutation games , a large subclass of permutation games which contains assignment games as well as permutation games whose grand coalition is essential. Indeed, it can happen in an n-player cyclic permutation game that all the 2 n coalitions survive a redundancy check with disjoint families (not in an assignment game, of course), however, with overlapping families all but at most n(n − 1) coalitions are ltered out (like in an assignment game).
As another application, in the second part of this paper we consider peer group games, and identify a collection of 2n − 1 coalitions that contains all strongly essential coalitions. In contrast, the number of essential coalitions could be as much as 2 n−1 +n−1. We propose an algorithm that computes the nucleolus of an n-player peer group game in O(n 2 ) time. It works directly from the data of the underlying peer group situation, so the coalition values need not be explicitly calculated.
The outline of the rest of the paper is as follows. We recall the necessary denitions in the next section. Strongly essential coalitions are introduced and their simplication possibilities for excess-based solutions in general games are discussed in section 3. We 2 specialize the general results to peer group games in section 4. Section 5 contains an O(n 2 ) algorithm for the nucleolus of an n-player peer group game. We illustrate the algorithm on a 9-player game in section 6.
Preliminaries
We start with the necessary denitions and notations. Let (N, v) be a transferable utility cooperative game, where N is the nonempty, nite set of players and v : 2 N → R is the coalitional function satisfying v(∅) = 0. We use the standard notation x(S) := i∈N a S i x i for the total payo to coalition S ⊆ N at payo allocation x ∈ R N , where a S ∈ R N denotes the membership vector of coalition S (i.e., a
Given a game (N, v), the excess e(S, x) := v(S) − x(S) of a coalition S at a payo allocation x is the usual measure of gain (or loss if negative) to S, if its members depart from the proposed x in order to form their own coalition. Note that e(∅, x) = 0 for all x ∈ R N . A payo allocation x ∈ R N is called ecient, if e(N, x) = 0; individually rational, if e({i}, x) ≤ 0 for all i ∈ N ; and coalitionally rational, if e(S, x) ≤ 0 for all S ⊆ N . We denote by I = the preimputation set (i.e., the set of ecient payos), by I the imputation set (i.e., the set of individually rational preimputations), and by C the core (i.e., the set of ecient and coalitionally rational payos). The kernel, denoted here by K, was introduced by Davis and Maschler (1965) . In this paper we only consider its intersection with the core. We call it kernelcore, and denote it by KC. It was shown by Maschler et al. (1979) that for any game, KC = K ∩ C = {x ∈ C : s ij (x) = s ji (x) ∀ i = j}, where the function s ij (x) := max{e(S, x) : S ⊂ N, S i, S j} measures the surplus of i against j at x.
The nucleolus, denoted here by N , was introduced by Schmeidler (1969) . It is a subset of the kernel (and in case the core is not empty, of the kernelcore) that consists of a single payo allocation, called the nucleolus allocation. The nucleolus is dened as follows. For payo allocation x let E(x) = [. . . ≥ e(S, x) ≥ . . . : ∅ = S = N ] denote the (2 n − 2)-component vector that is composed of the nonincreasingly arranged excesses of proper coalitions at x. The nucleolus is the set of imputations which lexicographically minimize the vector-valued function E(.) over the imputation set. Formally, N = {x ∈ I : E(x) lex E(y) ∀ y ∈ I}, where lex denotes the lexicographic order of vectors.
One obtains generalizations of the core, the kernelcore, and the nucleolus, by specifying a nonempty collection B ⊆ 2 N \ {∅, N } of coalitions, and by requiring that only the coalitions in B ∪ {N } determine the solution. We dene the B-core as C B = {x ∈ R N : e(N, x) = 0; e(S, x) ≤ 0 ∀ S ∈ B}; the B-kernelcore as Such generalizations might be useful in modeling situations where the cooperation of the players is restricted by some external factor (e.g. by communication diculties), and so it is natural to demand that only the coalitions which are capable of forming inuence the suggested outcome(s). For this paper, a more important reason is that the core, kernelcore, and nucleolus are often determined by a small collection of coalitions, and hence, the computation of the restricted solutions is signicantly easier. For such a collection a wellknown example is the collection of essential coalitions.
In a game (N, v), a coalition S is called inessential if it has a proper partition S = {S 1 , . . . , S r }, r ≥ 2, such that v(S) ≤ r j=1 v(S j ), consequently, e(S, x) ≤ r j=1 e(S j , x) for all x ∈ R N . Coalitions which are not inessential are called essential. Notice that single-player coalitions are always essential. The core is obviously independent of inessential coalitions. It was noticed by Huberman (1980) that in case the core is not empty, also the nucleolus is independent of inessential coalitions. By an analogous argument one easily shows that in case the core is not empty, the kernelcore is independent of inessential coalitions. More precisely, if a collection B ∪ {N } contains all essential coalitions in an n-player game, we have
• rank{a B : B ∈ B ∪ {N }} = n;
In the following section we identify a subclass of essential coalitions with the same properties.
Strongly essential coalitions
In this section we consider special essential coalitions, which we call strongly essential coalitions, and show that in any game the collection of strongly essential coalitions contains all the coalitions which actually determine the core, and in case the core is nonempty, the kernelcore and the nucleolus.
In a game (N, v), we say that a coalition S is weakly inessential if there are coalitions {S j } r j=1 , r ≥ 2, and numbers µ, σ ≥ 0 such that
The key feature of such a weakly inessential S is that
Obviously, an inessential coalition is weakly inessential with µ = 0. Coalitions which are not weakly inessential are called strongly essential. By an inductive argument it is easily seen that any weakly inessential S has a decomposition (1) such that all S j ∈ B (j = 1, . . . , r) are strongly essential.
As an illustration, consider the n(≥ 3)-player symmetric game with coalitional function v(S) = |S| − 1 for S = ∅. All coalitions are essential, but only the (n − 1)-and n-player coalitions are strongly essential. Indeed, for a coalition S with 1 ≤ |S| ≤ n − 2 and for a proper partition of
showing the weak inessentiality of S.
Next we summarize the properties of strongly essential coalitions which are useful in the computation of excess-based solutions.
Theorem 1 Let a collection B∪{N } contain all strongly essential coalitions in an n-player
(ii)
then {i} is weakly inessential, so its membership vector a {i} is a linear combination of the membership vectors a B (B ∈ B ∪ {N }). Since rank{a {i} : i ∈ N } = n, the claim follows.
(ii) Only C B ⊆ C needs explanation. Take an S ∈ B. It has a decomposition (1) such that S j ∈ B for all j = 1, . . . , r. If x ∈ C B then e(S j , x) ≤ 0 for all j = 1, . . . , r, so from (2) we get e(S, x) ≤ 0, i.e., S is redundant for C. It follows that C B ⊆ C.
(iii) We only need to show that for any pair of players i = j, s
N . On the other hand, at an x ∈ C, let s ij (x) = e(S, x) for some coalition S. If S is in B, we get e(S, x) ≤ s B ij (x), and the claim follows. If S is not in B, there is a collection {S k } r k=1 and a real number µ such that
. Since x is ecient, e(S, x) ≤ r k=1 e(S k , x). Clearly, we can assume without loss of generality that S k ∈ B for all k = 1, . . . , r. It follows from the nonpositivity of the excesses at core allocations that e(S, x) ≤ e(S k , x) for all k = 1, . . . , r. Moreover, there must be at least one coalition, say S k , in the decomposing collection which contains i but not j. We get e(S, x) ≤ e(S k , x) ≤ s B ij (x), and the claim follows. (iv) It follows from (i) that N B is a singleton, so we only need to show that
Intuitively it is clear: in the excess-prole E(x) of a core allocation x, the excess of a coalition S ∈ B is behind all the excesses in its excess-decomposition (2), so e(S, x) plays no role in the lexicographic minimization until any of the excesses e(S k , x) (k = 1, . . . , r) has some role, but when all of them become xed, so does e(S, x), and S has no chance to play a role.
A formal direct proof could be obtained by repeating verbatim the proof of Huberman (1980). We omit any further details because the general results of Granot et al. (1998) , or of Reijnierse and Potters (1998) easily give claim (iv).
Peer group games
Tree-connected peer group situations and related peer group games were introduced by Brânzei et al. (2002) to model economic and operations research situations in which agents with potential individual possibilities are connected via a hierarchy within an organization.
Given N = {1, . . . , n}, let T be a tree with node set N . We designate node 1 as the root of the tree, and hence, induce a partial ordering on N . We write j i if node j lies on the path from root 1 to node i. For each i ∈ N , let
In particular, P (1) = {1}, Q(1) = N , and R(1) = ∅. Notice that for i ≥ 2 the set R(i) consists of the nodes of a 1-rooted subtree whose complement Q(i) is an i-rooted subtree. The set N and the rooted tree T together with a nonnegative vector w ∈ R N + describes a peer group situation. The following example will be used throughout the paper. A peer group situation With peer group situation N, T, w we associate a transferable utility cooperative game, a peer group game. Its set of players is N , its coalitional function v is given by
with the standard convention that summing over the empty set gives 0. Throughout the paper we assume that w 1 = 0, i.e., the peer group game is 0-normalized. Given a 1-rooted tree T on node set N , let B 1 denote the collection of coalitions corresponding to the 1-rooted subtrees of T , including the tree T itself. Further, let B 0 := {{j} : j ∈ N \ {1}}, and B * := B 1 ∪ B 0 . We call a partition {S 1 , . . . , S r } of a nonempty coalition S the B * -partition of S if (i) S k ∈ B * for every k = 1, . . . , r; (ii) the partition is of minimum size among the partitions satisfying (i). Note that the B * -partition exists and is unique for all nonempty S ⊆ N .
Clearly, the coalitional function v of the peer group game corresponding to the peer group situation N, T, w satises
This implies that any 0-normalized peer-group game dened on the tree T is a T -component additive game, hence has a nonempty core (Le Breton et al., 1992; Potters and Reijnierse, 1995). Moreover, the collection B * contains all essential coalitions in any peer group game dened on T . Observe that |B * | can be as large as 2 |N |−1 + |N | − 1. Indeed, if T is the 1-rooted star-graph (i.e., each edge is of the form {1, j} for j ≥ 2), then |B 1 | = 2 |N |−1 . Let B 2 be the collection of the node sets of the 1-rooted subtrees with nonempty connected complement, i.e., B 2 := {R(i) : i ∈ N \ {1}}. Dene B := B 2 ∪ B 0 . We claim that the collection B ∪ {N } contains all strongly essential coalitions in any peer group game dened on the underlying 1-rooted tree. To see this, let S ∈ B 1 \ (B 2 ∪ {N }). Then r ≥ 2 edges of the tree go out from S, let i 1 , . . . , i r ∈ N \ S be the endnodes of those edges. Since For illustration, let S = {1} in our 9-player example. It has r = 2 neighbors in the tree: i 1 = 2 and i 2 = 3. From a {1} = a {1,2,4,5,7} + a {1,3,6,8,9} − a N and v({1}) = 0 = 102 + 120 − 222 = v({1, 2, 4, 5, 7}) + v({1, 3, 6, 8, 9}) − v(N ) we get that coalition {1} is weakly inessential. Note that the same is true in general whenever at least two branches start from the root. On the other hand, in case only one edge, say {1, 2}, leaves the root, we have {1} = R(2).
Therefore, Theorem 1 applied to peer group games immediately gives Corollary 1 Given a 1-rooted tree T on node set N = {1, . . . , n}, let B :
B ∪ {N } contains all strongly essential coalitions in any peer group game on T ;
In what follows we will be mainly concerned with how to utilize the last equivalence. Since our collection B consists of (in the number of players) linearly many coalitions, we know from Theorem 4.8 of Granot et al. (1998) that the B-nucleolus can be calculated in strongly polynomial time. More explicitly, due to the connectedness of each member of B in the underlying tree and the balancedness of the game, we can invoke the algorithm of Kuipers et al. (2000) and compute the B-nucleolus in O(n 3 |B|) = O(n 4 ) time. To input that algorithm, rst we would need to calculate the values of the coalitions in B from the peer group situation. Thanks to the additive nature of the required coalitional values, such preparation would take only O(n 2 ) time. We can do better, if we exploit the fact that player 1 is a veto player in any peer group game dened on any 1-rooted tree. Indeed, the streamlined version of the algorithm of Kuipers et al. (2000, p. 557 ) would compute the B-nucleolus in O(n 2 |B|) = O(n 3 ) time (after the coalitional values are derived in O(n 2 ) time). That variant however assumes the underlying tree to be a star-graph whose root is the veto-player, so the hierarchy among the other players as described by the peer group situation would not be utilized.
Alternatively, the nucleolus allocation of a peer group game can be determined as the unique kernel element. Since 0-normalized peer group games are tree-component additive games, the results of Potters and Reijnierse (1995) imply that the kernel consists only of the nucleolus allocation, that is the unique payo vector satisfying eciency and the n − 1 kernel conditions corresponding to the pairs of players connected by an edge of the underlying tree. Brânzei et al. (2000) compute the nucleolus of line-graph peer group games by solving that system of n equations. It is possible to eciently solve that nonlinear system even for general peer group games, in fact, the algorithm in the next section can be interpreted as doing just that.
For veto-rich games (i.e., nonnegative games with a veto player) Arin and Feltkamp (1997) proves that the nucleolus allocation can be calculated as the unique kernel element, and presents an algorithm that sequentially determines (even if the game is not balanced) the unique payo vector satisfying eciency and the n − 1 kernel conditions corresponding to the vetononveto pairs. Since peer group games are monotonic (hence balanced) vetorich games, in light of Corollary 1(iii) a specialized variant of that algorithm could be relevant for us. Indeed, if we streamline the algorithm of Arin and Feltkamp (1997) in a straightforward way for monotonic and B-restricted veto-rich games, we basically get the specialized algorithm of Kuipers et al. (2000, p. 557) . Thus, applied to peer group games we would obtain the same O(n 3 ) algorithm with the mentioned imperfection. In the next section we propose a renement of these algorithms that also exploits the additive nature of the coalitional values in the collection B. This enables us to work directly on the tree and with the weights of the underlying peer group situation, and compute the nucleolus allocation in O(n 2 ) time.
An algorithm for the nucleolus
We present an algorithm that computes the nucleolus of a peer group game directly from the data of the underlying peer group situation. 
. . , p n ) = the nucleolus allocation of the associated peer group game
In light of Corollary 1(iv), the validity of the algorithm is justied if we show that the output vector is the B-nucleolus allocation x * of the induced peer group game. It follows from the general Kohlberg-type characterization of B-nucleolus allocations (Maschler et al., 1992, Theorem 7.2) that the collection B t (x * ) = {S ∈ B : e(S, x) ≥ t} is balanced or empty for any number t. It is easily checked (or implied by Proposition 3.1 of Le Breton et al., 1992 ) that in the setting of Corollary 1, each balanced B-collection (i.e., all members are in B) that is minimal (for inclusion) is a B-partition of N , hence of the form P i := {R(i)} ∪ {{j} : j ∈ Q(i)} for some i ≥ 2. We obtain that at the B-nucleolus allocation x * , any nonempty collection B t (x * ) is the union of some of the partitions
We can sequentially determine the inclusively increasing sequence of the nonempty balanced collections B t (x * ) by reason of the following general fact: the sum of the excesses of coalitions in any balanced collection is the same constant for all ecient payo allocations.
Stated in our setting for minimal balanced collections, we have that for each partition P i (i ≥ 2) and for all ecient x,
Thus, after the initial phase of the algorithm, for each i ≥ 2, the value −p i equals the constant total excess of P i . Each node i ≥ 2 is considered active, because in the associated partition P i at least one (initially each) coalition is active (i.e., its excess at x * is not yet found). Notice that node (player) 1 is ignored, because coalition {1} is either weakly inessential (when more than one edges leave the root), or {1} = R(2) (when {1, 2} is the only edge incident to the root). Since the core is not empty, an excess of at most −α = 0 can be guaranteed to all (active) coalitions in B. Equivalently, by e({i}, x) = −x i , a payo of at least α can be secured for all (active) players.
In the rst round of the iterative phase of the algorithm, the value −β equals the highest excess at x * . Indeed, B is the union of the partitions P i (i ≥ 2), and in each partition P i the maximum excess is minimized, if its total −p i = −w(Q(i)) excess is distributed equally among its q i = 1 + |Q(i)| active members. The collection of the highest-excess coalitions at x * is the union of the partitions P i associated with the nodes i ∈ B as found in step (L1) of the loop.
Step (L2) formalizes the fact that xing the excesses in one partition might also determine the excesses in another partition. Indeed, if i ∈ B and j ∈ Q(i) then it follows from Q(j) ⊆ Q(i) that node j too becomes settled, because each coalition in the associated partition becomes settled (i.e., its excess at x * has been found). In step (L3) the activesettled status of the nodes (players) and the guaranteed payo to the active players are adjusted. After (L3), −α is the smallest excess level that can be guaranteed to all coalitions which entered the round as active. The p values of these nodes are updated in step (L4). The nodes in B have just become settled, they get the current guaranteed level α, the nucleolus payo to the associated players. The nodes in A remain active, their updated p value is the negative of what is left from the total excess of the associated partition after each active coalition in that round received the increment β found in that round.
Any subsequent round starts with counting the number of still active coalitions in each active partition. Thus, after step (L0) we always have that
• the nodes (players) in A are the active ones;
• for each i ∈ A, the value −p i is the total excess available for distribution among the q i active coalitions in P i ;
• the excess of each currently active coalition at x * is at most −α, or equivalently, the nucleolus payo to each active player is at least α.
The discussion above of what happens in the rst round can therefore be repeated, mutatis mutandis.
The iterative phase ends when all non-root nodes become settled. Then for all i ≥ 2, the nal value of p i is the nucleolus payo to player i. Thus, p 1 as computed by eciency in the nal step of the algorithm is the nucleolus payo to player 1. Therefore, the output vector (p 1 , . . . , p n ) is indeed the nucleolus allocation.
We recommend to follow the worked out 9-player example in the next section. It is crafted so that all subtleties of the algorithm could be demonstrated. Now let us see how long it takes to actually perform the steps of the algorithm. We assume that the peer group situation is given by two arrays of size n, both indexed by the node labels. The rst array contains for each non-root node the other endpoint of the edge toward the root, the second array species the node weights. We assume that the edges are {i, t(i)}, i ≥ 2, and the nodes are labeled (e.g. by breadth-rst search) so that t(i) < i for each edge. For example, our 9-player peer group situation would be given by the arrays: The initialization is performed only once.
Step (I1) is done in O(n) elementary operations, if, for example, the active-settled status of the nodes are represented by a third array of size n.
Step (I2) can also be done in O(n) elementary operations, for example with the following backward tracking routine: Therefore, the initialization phase of the algorithm can be performed in O(n) time.
The iterative phase consists of at most n − 1 rounds, because in each round at least one of the non-root nodes becomes settled.
Step ( 
Step (L2) can also be done in O(n) time with the following routine: (L2) for i:=2 to n if i ∈ A and t(i) ∈ B then B := B ∪ {i}
Step (L3) requires O(n) time.
Step (L4) can also be done in O(n) time, for example with the following routine: (L4) for i:=2 to n if i ∈ A then p i := p i − βq i if i ∈ B then p i := α Therefore, one round of the loop takes O(n) time, so the iterative phase can be performed in O(n 2 ) time. The nal step requires O(n) time. It follows that the algorithm itself can be performed in O(n 2 ) time. The space requirement of the algorithm is O(n). More explicitly, only an array of n records (indexed by the node labels) are needed, each record consisting of three types of information: the father node, the weight, and the active-settled status of the given node.
An example
We illustrate the algorithm on our 9-player peer group situation.
The algorithm starts with α = 0 and A = {2, . . . , 9}. After the initialization the p-value of a node shows the total weight of the subtree stemming from that node. After step (L0) 11 of the rst round the q-value gives the number of coalitions in the partition associated with that node. P P P P P P P P P # # # # # Iteration 1 (α = 0)
In this iteration the minimum ratio β = 10 is attained at nodes B = {5, 8} (indicated by dashed boxes). Since both of them are leaves, B remains unchanged in step (L2). Thus, nodes 5 and 8 become settled (indicated by double-lined boxes) with the increased value of α = 10.
Iteration 2 starts with the updated tree with active nodes A = {2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 9}. In step (L1) we nd β = 8 and B = {6}. Since node 9 is an active node in the subtree stemming from node 6, it also gets settled with the increased α = 18, so after step (L2) we have B = {6, 9}.
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In iteration 3 only A = {2, 3, 4, 7} are the active nodes. In this round we get β = 2 and B = {7}.
Iteration 4 starts with active nodes A = {2, 3, 4}. In step (L1) we nd β = 4 and B = {2}. Node 4 is also an active node in the subtree stemming from node 2, both gets settled with the increased α = 24, so after step (L2) we have B = {2, 4}.
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For iteration 5 we are left with only one active node A = {3}. P P P P P P P P P # # # # 9 p 9 = 18
Iteration 5 (α = 24)
In this round β = 13 and B = {3}, so the iterative phase ends after the updating steps.
Finally, after computing p 1 from eciency, the algorithm stops with the nucleolus allocation values in variables p. P P P P P P P P P # # # #
